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"UNIFYING" THE MILITARY SERVICES - A JOINT CHALLENGE

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ABSTRACT

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Joint operations require a certain amount of unifying of the services and this results in a natural struggle over autonomy. Unifying the military, to any degree, must address the distinct and enduring character of each service. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) revolves around the emerging technologies in information, sensors, and precision strike weaponry resulting in unprecedented precision in both the planning and execution of warfare. This RMA will overcome the natural struggle of autonomy between the services because enhanced speed, range, and precision, coupled with greater battlespace situational awareness, will facilitate interservice cooperative engagements. Each service can develop their unique capability or specialty within a common joint frame of reference allowing the armed forces to achieve enhanced levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. The determinant causal factor will be our ability to embrace improved command and control capabilities within a common interservice framework. Within this common framework, the Service Chiefs will be able to preserve their organizational autonomy while the warfighting CINCs focus on the synergy (jointness) capable of being generated from the strengths of each service.

Our Challenge

We may find there are natural limits to the scope and utility of tactical jointness. But we most certainly have not even closely approached them thus far.

*William E. DePuy
General (RET), Sept 1989*

Unfortunately, General DePuy's words are as appropriate in 1996 as they were seven years ago. The gravest concern is that they will still ring true seven years from now and again in 2010. This concern does not stem from a perceived lack of effort within the Department of Defense or any of the services in a quest to enhance joint operations. On the contrary, one would be hard pressed to identify a more widely publicized subject for debate in defense politics.

Jointness is an extremely difficult and complex subject involving organizations with histories as long and rich as the nation they defend. Joint operations require a certain amount of unifying of the services and this results in a natural struggle over autonomy. Any serious plan to unify the military, to any degree, must address the distinct and enduring character of each service. Their unique character defines how they perceive warfare and their autonomy therein.¹

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) could be a close rival in popularity for debate. This revolution in military affairs revolves around the available and emerging technologies in information, sensors, and precision strike weaponry. Our modern military forces will be capable of unprecedented precision in both the planning and execution of warfare. This enhanced ability to use deadly violence with greater speed, range, and precision, coupled with greater battlespace situational

¹ James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy. (United States, Basic Books, 1989), 186.

awareness, will facilitate interservice cooperative engagements.² The beauty of this phenomena is that the anticipated outcome of the RMA can potentially overcome the natural struggle of autonomy between the services. Each service can develop their unique capability or specialty within a common joint frame of reference allowing the armed forces to achieve enhanced levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.

The common quest for enhanced joint warfighting effectiveness can be achieved within the first decade of the next century. The determinant causal factor will be our ability to embrace improved command and control capabilities within a common interservice framework.³ Within this common (joint) framework (paradigm), the Service Chiefs will be able to preserve their organizational autonomy while the warfighting CINCs focus on the synergy (jointness) capable of being generated from the strengths of each service.

The Future Landscape

Rather than a single , focused threat, America's twenty-first century Army faces a broad range of challenges.

*General Gordon R. Sullivan
Chief of Staff, United States Army*

Due to the ever accelerating rates of change throughout the world, our future security landscape will be more dynamic and less predictable than the recent past. This perplexing international problem has proven to be quite challenging even to our nation's academic elite. How to deal with the new world order, or lack thereof, has become the "debate of the decade". The problem is not that there is no right

² Joseph S. Nye Jr. and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge." Foreign Affairs (March/April)1995: 23.

³ C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and The Common Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) , 256.

answer. The problem is precisely that there are potentially too many right answers . . . in the near term.

The near term will take us through the first decade of the next century, the year 2010. We will face an uncertain future threat. The likelihood of a peer competitor of the United States military, similar to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, arising during this period is low. However, the predominance of conventional warfare for limited objectives in the context of a regional conflict is most probable.⁴ These regional conflicts will center on the control of people and territory and be fought against a land power based threat.⁵

We will face an uncertain future budget. However, the size of the military budget most likely will not increase. In fact, the attempt by both political parties to balance the federal budget could result in severe reductions in defense spending. Isolationists will ask why the United States would want to fund a large and expensive military if the most likely scenario is a regional conflict against a land power based threat. The services will be living in an era of scarcity where efficiency of operations will be vital.

We can not afford to face a future of *uncertain* U.S. military capability. Our military has already reduced in size by more than one-third since the end of the Cold War. A CONUS based, force projection military brings with it some unique challenges. This force is smaller but not necessarily cheaper. Technological advances add to the uncertainty with expectations of quick and decisive victory as well as reduced casualties, both friendly and enemy.

The dilemma is how to organize, train and equip the right force for the near term future, through the year 2010: "A challenge even for the United States, which will find itself attempting to project military power for limited purposes and at a

⁴ Eliot A.Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare", Foreign Affairs (March/April 1996): 52.

⁵ U. S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations (Washing Headquarters, 1993) 1-5.

low cost in material and lives.”⁶ Precisely because the future landscape is so unpredictable and demanding, no one service is capable of meeting this challenge alone. In fact, this challenge can only be met through enhanced joint warfighting capability of all services adding to the common defense.

The Common Defense

Struggles over autonomy are especially visible when the organizations involved have similar tasks, as do the armed forces.

James Q. Wilson

During the Revolutionary War the Army and the Navy planted their seeds of autonomy. Throughout the first half of our nation’s history these seeds became deeply rooted. In Samuel Huntington’s classic on American civil-military relations, *The Soldier and the State*, we find this concise and revealing explanation of the United States Constitution’s provisions to ensure civilian control of our emerging military organizations:

The Framers’ concept of civilian control was to control the uses to which civilians might put military force rather than to control the military themselves. They were more afraid of military power in the hands of political officials than of political power in the hands of military officers. Unable to visualize a distinct military class, they could not fear such a class. But there was need to fear the concentration of authority over the military in any single governmental institution.⁷

The language of the Constitution itself describes the Army and the Navy

⁶ Cohen, 53.

⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) 168.

as separate and distinct organizations established to fulfill different functions. The Navy assumed the role of power projection while the Army maintained security within the nation and assisted in our western expansion. This resulted in the Navy assuming a broader role in the common defense of our maritime nation. Our respected Navy protected our economic interests abroad by securing trade on the high seas. Our faithful Army stood guard along the western frontier and remained ready to expand its ranks and defend against an invading land force should the first line of defense, our Navy, fail to protect our sanctuary. The roots of each service's autonomy were firmly established.⁸

Up until the Civil War, there was little, if any, interaction between the services. During the Spanish-American War and World War I, the Army and the Navy found themselves conducting operations in close proximity to each other and the first concept of shared battlespace was born. The problems associated with a shared battlespace included the need to cooperate, or at least coordinate their actions, with one another. This resulted in an attempt to adopt a doctrine of mutual cooperation. This mutual cooperation doctrine gave rise to an attempt to understand the principles of war, in both planning and executing warfare, on land and sea.⁹

The teachings of Jomini and Clausewitz dominated the strategic thought for land warfare doctrine. The importance of seapower was best espoused by Alfred Thayer Mahan. This attempt to establish a common doctrine of mutual cooperation, originally an attempt to coordinate their tactical actions in a shared battlespace, resulted in a debate over strategic primacy. Thus, rather than bringing the two services closer together and creating a more efficient military force, this problem of shared battlespace fueled their natural struggle for autonomy.

World War I produced the first large scale demand on the American

⁸ Allard, 24-46.

⁹ Ibid, 47.

military to raise, equip, transport, and sustain a force on a foreign continent. This created yet another logical reason for mutual cooperation doctrine to be adopted. Not only was the tactical battlespace being shared, as during the Spanish-American War, we now faced the challenge of sharing strategic and tactical battlespace. To complicate this two dimension problem of sea-land battlespace, the airplane made its debut into combat. We now needed to deconflict a three dimensional problem.

By the end of World War I, both the Army and the Navy had enhanced their autonomy. Each service could claim their share in victory. Both were the strongest in our nation's history. Organizational identity and character had been established through battlefield victories on land and sea. Each had established a framework within its own dimension for the application of firepower. No war could be fought, let alone won, without the contributions of both the Army and the Navy .

This growth of service autonomy would be challenged by the airplane. The airplane was first used as a sensor and ultimately as a weapon. Both services planned to adopt this new capability into their organizational structure. An unintended consequence of this adoption was the "subversive effect on the time honored division of labor between land and sea forces".¹⁰ Whereas there was a distinct dimensional demarcation for ships and tanks, the airplane transcended both service's battlespace.

This fact created quite a novel and fundamental problem for the Army and the Navy to contemplate. For the Navy it was simply the completion of the circle begun with the emergence on the submarine. Now the Navy would subdivide their ocean battlespace into three distinct mediums: surface, subsurface, and above the surface. The Army was quick to embrace this new technology, but was unaware of it's potential to change the tactical as well as the strategic battlespace in the future.

The inter war period saw the emergence of air power that was advertised to break the stalemate of surface warfare. World War I had resulted in millions of

¹⁰ Ibid, 87.

casualties and protracted slaughter for both the armies and navies of the world. The potential of air power directly threatened the autonomy of the Navy. The Navy's three medium ocean battlespace posed a very substantial organizational and command and control problem. The Army viewed air power as additional firepower that would augment the artillery in support of ground forces advancing within the battlespace. The Army failed to consider the long term ramifications of aircraft conducting long range bombing beyond the tactical battlespace. Effective bombing of enemy surface forces beyond the range of advancing friendly surface forces could threaten the Army's traditional roles and missions.

It is logical to expect that air power advocates would emerge. Control of the air meant ultimate victory with substantially reduced loss of life. Air power threatened the autonomy of both the Army and the Navy. BG Billy Mitchell was air power's strongest advocate. As commander of the U.S. First Army Air Service during World War I he said, "One flight over the lines gave me a much clearer impression of how the armies were laid out than any amount of traveling around on the ground. A very significant thing to me was that we should cross the lines of these contending armies in a few minutes in our airplane, whereas the armies had been locked in the struggle, immovable, powerless to advance for three years. . . ."¹¹ Mitchell's vision consisted of air power that was focused on both the enemy's military and economic centers of gravity instead of being relegated to a tactical fire support role for the Army. He also conducted the famous sinking of a German battleship in 1921 by his bombers. This successful demonstration of the vulnerability of unprotected capital ships to air attack generated support for autonomy of the air service.

Air power had become a proven entity and it transcended the clean line of demarcation between the Army and the Navy. The old doctrine of mutual cooperation was no longer valid. The tactical and strategic battlespace of the services

¹¹ William Mitchell, Memoirs of World War I, (New York: Random House, 1960) 630-632.

were overlapping and required a cleaner method of command and control. A clear requirement for unity of command was at hand. However, this was not to be. The natural struggle for service autonomy won out, at least through the end of World War II. Unity of command was achieved in the European Theater only because it was primarily an Army operation with the Navy conducting a minor role. In the Pacific Theater, where there was equal Army and Navy presence, there existed two separate but equal commands: Admiral Nimitz for the Pacific Ocean Area command, and General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Areas command.¹² Even the pressure of a world war failed to create the conditions to overcome the struggle for service autonomy. With the unconditional surrenders of Germany and Japan the services were quick to attempt to take the lead in the peacetime struggle to preserve or enhance their autonomy.

“Unifying” the Military Services

If organization matters, it is also the case that there is no one best way to organize

James Q. Wilson

Each of our services has a distinctly unique and rich history. A study of their histories provides the origin of cultural differences and biases. The character of the organization and the warriors within it are revealed. In his provocative work, *The Masks of War*, Carl H. Builder explains it this way:

The personality differences of the three American military services are profound, pervasive, and persistent. Since these personalities are deeply embedded inside large military institutions, they will persist despite changes in administration, the Department of Defense, the

¹² Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) 18.

Joint Chiefs, and the joint or specified command. They will even persist through the trauma of war. They affect how the services, in peacetime, perceive war and then plan and buy and train forces.¹³

Serious plans were initiated after the end of World War II to unify the armed forces. The major proponent was the Army. The War Department believed that a single military chief of staff reporting to a civilian secretary of defense could best serve the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Air Force was a proponent because reorganization was the best way to ensure its autonomy. The Army air force was obsessed with becoming a separate service. The Army was willing to assist in this because the Army air force had become so large that it threatened to dominate the Army. The Army was concerned about losing control of their traditional roles and missions of a land power force. The stipulation of the Army was that all three services would be joined at the top by a single military commander.¹⁴

The opponent of this unification effort was the Navy. The reason for their objection revolved around autonomy. This resistance was understandable since the Navy was already a mini defense department in its own right. It possessed its own land forces, the Marine Corps, and air forces, naval aviation, in addition to its ships. Any reorganization threatened at least a part of the naval organization. In the Navy's opinion, the worse case scenario would have the Marine Corps transferred to the Army and naval aviation melded into the newly established U.S. Air Force. Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, offered a counter proposal to the Army plan: a committee approach to restructuring with two coordinating committees - the top military commanders of each service forming the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a group of senior civilian officials concerned with defense which would become the National Security Council.

¹³ Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) 5.

¹⁴ Wilson, 186.

The National Security Act of 1947 was the compromise between the Army and Navy plans that was eventually reached. As the most important piece of defense legislation since the Constitution, it restructured the organization that is charged with ensuring the security of our nation. Major provisions include:

- Creation of a cabinet-level Department of Defense
- Legislative authority and recognition for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a coordinating, not a commanding, agency of the armed forces
- Establishment of a new service, the United States Air Force
- Elimination of the War and the Navy departments as cabinet-level agencies, subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, placing them on equal status with the Air Force (1949 amendment to the act)
- Delineation of the principle functions, roles and missions, of each of the services
- Creation of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council¹⁵

This compromise resulted in a unified defense establishment that was acceptable to all services. The Army's desire for a single Defense Department was adopted. The Secretary of Defense would have few powers, which was the Navy's desire. A new service was created for the Air Force. Service autonomy was retained as a result of this compromise. Nevertheless, interservice rivalry emerged almost immediately.

The Navy and the Air Force desired to participate in strategic deterrence. The Navy fought hard for defense dollars to build aircraft carriers while the Air Force sought those same dollars to procure long-range bombers. Intuitively, there should have been a major struggle for autonomy between the Navy and the Air Force over control of all military aviation. Ironically, it was the Army that resisted the Air Force's

¹⁵ Allard, 112.

desire to control all military aviation. This unintended consequence created a turf issue between the Army and the Air Force in the procurement arena.

In 1948, less than a year after the compromise, Secretary Forrestal chaired the Key West conference. This conference was convened to allow the services to settle their differences. The major point of contention over service autonomy was close air support (CAS). The agreement included a provision for the Air Force to "procure and control" all aircraft designed to support army infantry operations. The Army was precluded from buying any fixed-wing aircraft over five thousand pounds.¹⁶

The Korean War disclosed the fallacy of the agreement. The Air Force's quest for service autonomy dictated that they fly high performance fighters and long-range bombers, with a heavy emphasis on bombers. These are the type of aircraft that the air service requires to ensure they add their required contribution, within their dimension, to the common defense. There were no slower, well armored aircraft capable of carrying heavy payloads suitable for the task of close air support for Army ground forces. More importantly, even if the Air Force had the correct type of aircraft, they were opposed to allowing them to be controlled by Army ground commanders. The Army's response was a request to procure the right aircraft for the task out of the Army budget. Congress reminded the Army of the Key West Accords and the plan was stymied. The Army refused to allow this requirement to go unfulfilled. An Army general noticed that the Key West Accords referred only to 'fixed-wing' aircraft. Nothing was mentioned about 'rotary-wing' aircraft. The Army began to procure armed helicopters to perform the vital task of close air support that the Air Force was reluctant to perform. This is a prime example of an argument not being settled on merit but on the basis of each service's strong conviction for autonomy. The former military budget

¹⁶ Wilson, 186.

analysis, Richard Stubbing, captures the essence of the problem in this account:

The Air Force continues to give minimal attention to close air support and buys just enough aircraft to protect its claim to the close-air-support mission. Meanwhile, the Army, unsure that it can rely on Air Force support when it is needed, purchases a vast fleet of attack helicopters which, while more expensive and potentially more vulnerable, can be placed under direct Army command.¹⁷

On the surface, this military turf battle (and many others) appears to be an example of organizational imperialism; a quest to be in command of more, and the belief that more is better and the most is best. That conclusion is superficial at best. Both services are attempting to be true to their roles and missions. Army leaders are most concerned that the effects of fire from the close support aircraft occur exactly when and where it is needed against enemy ground units. Their training and combat experience has taught them that this task must be coordinated and controlled with extreme precision in order to ensure protection of friendly ground units. Likewise, the Air Force leadership is not reluctant to perform the close support mission because they have disdain for that type of task. Their training and combat experience has shown them that slower, armored aircraft with a heavy payload are quite vulnerable to high-performance, maneuverable enemy aircraft. Their professional competence dictates that they procure tactical aircraft that are as fast and maneuverable as the enemy they will encounter in their dimension of the battlespace. The basic problem still exists. These same fast, maneuverable aircraft aren't very good at close support missions for ground units.

A similar turf issue arose in the antisubmarine warfare arena during World War II. Which service should control the land-based aircraft dedicated to search

¹⁷ Ibid, 187.

the sea-lanes for enemy submarines? Safety of the convoys was a Navy responsibility and, after all, it was Navy personnel manning many of those ships. It is most logical that the Navy desired for the aircraft to remain close to the convoy and be under Navy *control*. The army air force was responsible for the elimination of the German submarines. They proposed a wide area search under Army air force control to enhance their attrition battle. The Navy position was adopted because the task was vital to the Navy and of a lesser importance to the Army air force. It smoothed out the command and control problem also by allowing the Navy to own and therefore control the firepower platform.

There are no easy answers to this most difficult *dilemma of finding the correct match between mission and jurisdictional control*: the practical reason for service rivalry. This reality makes it extremely difficult to coordinate any sort of interservice agreement without some portion of the agreement being viewed as a threat to their autonomy. The opportunity and the temptation then exists to enter into a form of collusion. Services will enter onto agreements that protect each other's autonomy. This is the state of affairs in which the Joint Chiefs found themselves for most of the Cold War.

The Cold War presented the Joint Chiefs with a peer competitor for each and every service. The Soviets had to be confronted and defeated in all three dimensions of the battlespace. Service autonomy was easy to maintain and interservice rivalries developed mainly over attempts to enhance that autonomy. The Navy and the Air Force struggled over control of strategic nuclear forces. A compromise agreement resulted in the infamous TRIAD of land, sea, and air based delivery systems. In the conventional arena there were more than sufficient threats to go around. The numerically superior land based forces of the Warsaw Pact were supported heavily by numerous aviation fronts composed of sophisticated attack

helicopters, high-performance fighters, and long-range bombers. The Soviet Navy was threatening to become a serious blue-water threat. No one service could even conceive of fighting, much less winning, a global war against such a potent threat, alone. Joint operations at the tactical and operational levels of war were required for the defense of Central Europe.

The development of these required joint operations began in earnest in 1973. Vietnam was behind us and the results of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars were staring us in the face. The increased range, accuracy, and lethality of all weapon systems, but especially direct-fire systems, demonstrated in the Middle East, caused the Army leadership grave concern. United States ground forces in NATO appeared vulnerable to a massive attack by the modernized Warsaw Pact. Tank and artillery losses in the 1973 Middle East War were greater than the complete inventory of those systems in USAREUR.¹⁸

In 1976 the Army published *Field Manual 100-5*. The Active Defense was born. But more importantly was the inclusion of Chapter 8, "Air-Land Battle". In it General DePuy ensured the following statement was highlighted: *the Army cannot win the land battle without the Air Force*.¹⁹ This was the beginning of a 15 year partnership between the Army and the Air Force that brought us as close to joint operations as we would get during the Cold War.

The Warsaw Pact 's doctrine of massed armored formations presented the ideal target array for this joint operation partnership to flourish. Both services agreed on the importance of Close Air Support (CAS) and the Air Force bought the slow, armored, tank killing A-10 as the dedicated CAS platform. They agreed on the importance of suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) and developed detailed and shared tactical procedures to ensure it's success. Finally, they agreed on the

¹⁸ Harold R. Winton, "Partnership and Tension: The Army and Air Force Between Vietnam and Desert Storm". *Parameters* 26 (Spring 1996)103.

¹⁹ U. S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington Headquarters, 1993) 8-1.

importance of the simultaneous attack of second echelon forces (Follow On Forces Attack).

The areas of disagreement revolved around *control* of air interdiction operations and the deconfliction of fixed-wing aircraft and extended range Army systems: "...one could conclude that while at the tactical level there was very significant agreement, at the operational level there was noticeable divergence."²⁰ This divergence at the operational level would come to a head in Desert Storm.

As the Army and Air Force were working on their partnership for victory on the plains of Central Europe, the Navy was quietly doubling its size to a 600 ship blue-water maritime power that would ensure control of the high seas. This was vital to our common defense. Without secure sea lines of communications, the Army could not deploy sufficient forces to the fight and keep them sustained through to victory in the Air-Land battle of Central Europe. All three services were organized, trained, and equipped as the right force for the time. Service rivalry over procurement dollars was uninspired due to a sufficient defense budget. Rivalry concerning turf issues in the operational level of war were a direct result of the enhanced range of Army fire support systems, to include attack helicopters. The Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL), a permissive fire support control measure, was losing ~~its~~ identity as the clear demarcation of where Army battlespace ended and exclusive Air Force battlespace began. Again, the *dilemma of finding the correct match of mission and jurisdictional control* arose as the practical reason for service rivalry.

During these same years of Cold War build-up, the Department of Defense was beset with a series of failures pointing to severe problems and shortcomings in the area of joint operations. Congressional displeasure with joint operations started with the outcome of the Vietnam War. The Mayaguez incident in 1975 raised more concerns. The disaster of Desert One in 1980 seemed to validate

²⁰ Winton, 114.

their concerns. The tragic loss of 241 Marines in the Beirut bombing of 1983 and the command and control problems during the Grenada operation a few days later were sufficient to force our congressional leaders to take action.

The Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report in 1985 that culminated in the infamous Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This was the first legislative action since 1947 to affect the organization and operations of our military services. This historic intervention was driven by the intent to improve and strengthen joint operations. It's basic provisions are:

- Increased responsibilities and authorities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; sole military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense
- Creation of a four star Vice Chairman who outranks the Service Chiefs
- Joint Specialty Officer designation in all services with detailed instructions and binding laws that regulate their selection, education, assignment, and promotion
- CINCs of the unified and specified commands were given increased authority over service components and a greater role in resource planning

This attempt to shift the balance of power in favor of joint institutions caused a shockwave throughout the Department of Defense. Each service immediately took stock of the effects of this Act on its own autonomy.

Congress was attempting to force a shift from service dominance to joint participation. What appeared as a logical and simple solution would prove to be logical but quite complicated. Complicated because the Act did not remove anyone from the equation. In fact, it added more. The force development process is a prime example. Congress wanted the CINCs to use future war plans to drive force requirements. Logical, but not that simple. There are still four central participants in

this vital process: the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant CINCs, and the services. General DePuy captured the essence of the unique contribution each of the four participants makes to the process:

None of these functions is transferable. No one but the Navy can organize, train, and equip carrier battle groups; the Army - corps and divisions; the Air Force - wings and squadrons; and the Marines - amphibious forces. The force development process is therefore circular, iterative, interactive, and complex. It represents a vast sharing of responsibilities across several huge bureaucratic institutions. It does no good to simplify it on paper. It will not simplify.²¹

This is not to say that the intent to shift from service dominance to joint participation is incorrect. On the contrary, it is precisely the correct intent. The reality is that jointness can not be achieved directly by the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

However, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has created some strong enablers working towards the desired end state of enhanced joint warfighting. The increased authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has produced a series of doctrinal joint manuals. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 10JAN95 is in its second edition and General Shalikashvili has just released *Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*. These publications are comprehensive and authoritative in nature. Similar to the initial series of Army doctrinal manuals of the mid-seventies, they are vivid symbols to the individual services of our senior military leader's commitment to jointness.

The Vice Chairman's ranking over the Service Chiefs enables him to be

²¹ William E. DePuy, "For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb". Parameters 25, (Summer 1995) 148.

the honest broker at the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC). The increased authority of the combatant CINCs to provide input on force requirements adds to the integrity of the JROC process. However, we are still haunted with the potential for collusion amongst the services due to the committee nature of this process.

The strongest enabler of the Act is the provision for Joint Specialty Officers. This legal requirement will produce a generation of senior military officers who have learned and practiced joint warfighting. Stephen P. Rosen presents a compelling argument for this theory of military innovation. He states that control over the promotions of officers is the source of power in the military and this promotion process takes a generation, approximately 20 years.²² That would place us at the year 2006, at the earliest, for this innovative influence to take effect.

Therefore, Goldwater-Nichols provides us with enablers that result in a tendency to gravitate towards jointness. This gravitational tendency is not strong enough to overcome service dominance of warfighting in the near future. The result will be too little, too late!

The Imperative of Jointness

No single military service embodies all of the capabilities needed to respond to every situation and threat. Our national strategy calls for the individual services to operate jointly to ensure both that we can operate successfully in all warfare areas and that we can apply our military power across the spectrum of foreseeable situations.

Forward . . . From The Sea

The common quest for enhanced joint warfighting effectiveness remains our greatest challenge. The future landscape complicates this challenge due to its dynamic and unpredictable nature. The history of our armed forces demonstrates a

²²Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning The Next War, (London: Cornell University Press, 1991) 20.

natural and persistent struggle for autonomy, resulting in lively and spirited interservice rivalries. Repeated efforts by outside agencies to resolve this conundrum have fallen short of the mark. Possibly, the solution to this challenge must come from within the organization itself. But what is the best way to organize, or reorganize, this massive bureaucracy we call the Defense Department into an entity capable of achieving enhanced joint warfighting effectiveness?

James Q. Wilson, renowned organizational theorist, states that success of an organization depends on how they cope with three organizational issues:

- Deciding how to perform the organization's *critical task*
- Agreement about and widespread endorsement of the way the critical task is defined.
- Acquiring sufficient freedom of action and external political support to permit it to redefine its tasks as it sees best and to infuse that definition with a sense of mission.²³

So, what is the *critical task* that will result in enhanced joint warfighting effectiveness? To transcend the natural struggle for service autonomy, this *critical task* must be broad enough in scope to guide the Service Chiefs in their primary responsibility of organizing, training, and equipping the joint warfighting force. It must also be narrow enough in focus to guide the combatant CINCs in their primary responsibility of planning joint warfighting operations.

Traditionally, service roles and missions have served this function. Distinct roles and missions for each service have provided the armed forces with a useful metric for resolving force structure and procurement issues. This traditional metric is sufficiently broad in scope but lacks the required focus described above. Service Chiefs rely heavily on the broad scope of its roles and missions and it has served them well. Combatant CINCs have found it difficult to use this traditional metric

²³ Wilson, 25.

to justify specific requirements for their joint warfighting plans.

Therefore, the identification of the *critical task* must embody the traditional roles and mission metric. By so doing, the second and third coping issues in Wilson's theory are accommodated: service endorsement and sufficient freedom of action that the services have come to expect. The narrow focus of the *critical task* that the combatant CINCs require can be derived from the dilemma of finding the correct match of mission and jurisdictional control. This dilemma is most profound in the future battlespace of joint warfighting.

Battlespace is a construct, an orderly arrangement of facts, that guide the commander's visualization of the entire battlefield. This demands an intellect capable of grasping the time and space limitations associated with his force's ability to detect and engage enemy targets. This ability to detect and engage is not necessarily constrained by terrain as in the past.²⁴ Our future battlespace will be less dense in terms of number of units and platforms, yet increasingly lethal due to the technological advances in information processing, sensors, and precision strike weaponry. Future commanders will possess the capability to concentrate the effects of joint firepower on multiple enemy target arrays, simultaneously, throughout the breadth and depth of the battlespace.

The Army is at the forefront of defining this new construct of battlespace. The Army's Force XXI Campaign Plan is focused squarely on the command and control and integration of combat power within its ever expanding area of influence. The increased range and accuracy of Army deep attack weapon systems coupled with increased dispersion and mobility of Army ground and air assets results in a significant expansion of the battlespace traditionally *controlled* by the Army commander.²⁵

The Naval Services began a landmark shift in their operational focus with

²⁴ U. S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-200-4, Mounted Battlespace, (1994) 3.

²⁵ U. S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-200-5, Depth and Simultaneous Attack, (1994) 2.

the publication of *Forward. . . From The Sea*. This authoritative vision statement, carrying the combined signatures of the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, reads ; "This fundamental shift was a direct result of the changing strategic landscape -- away from having to deal with a global maritime threat and toward projecting power and influence across the seas in response to regional challenges". The Navy has moved from blue to brown water to extend the range of its strike force's firepower effects inland against enemy target arrays to enhance their joint warfighting contribution. This results from the lack of a viable blue-water threat in the near future and the Navy's unique ability to provide the early entry firepower required in a regional conflict. This littoral based naval firepower is then available to continue to contribute to joint warfighting within the same battlespace routinely controlled by the Army.²⁶

The predominance of joint warfighting up until the year 2010 will be regional conflicts. That implies that the Theater of Operations will most likely encompass a relatively small area, perhaps no larger than the expanding battlespace doctrinally under Army control. The Air Force appears to be committed to an "inside-out warfare scheme", remaining focused on both economic and military centers of gravity of the enemy's nation. Regardless, the effects of fires from the majority of Air Force assets could now be confined to the enemy target arrays contained within the Army battlespace.

The spatial and temporal expansion of this joint battlespace coupled with the probability of the theater of operations being spatially reduced by the limited purposes of regional conflicts "will result in service-specific functional battlespace intersecting and overlapping".²⁷ This situation creates a practical reason for service rivalry, rather than a purely historical one.

²⁶ Department of the Navy, *Forward...From the Sea*, (Washington, 1996) 1-8.

²⁷ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 3-8.

It is quite apparent that solving this dilemma of the correct match of mission and jurisdictional control within the joint battlespace of future regional conflicts is the *critical task* for joint operations. This means we must focus on the tactical level of war to drive requirements for joint warfighting effectiveness. This is counter-intuitive and completely opposite of our approach to jointness since the end of World War II. Jointness was desired and required at the strategic and operational levels of war. Sealift and airlift for ground forces were touted as premiere examples of jointness. Most of these are merely examples of mutual cooperation between the services based on the historical reason for interservice rivalry: roles and missions.

This *critical task* of correctly matching the mission and jurisdictional control within the joint battlespace can be used by the combatant CINCs to plan joint warfighting campaigns and provide input of force requirements necessary to successfully execute those war plans.

This matching of mission and jurisdictional control at the tactical level of war will take us beyond the mutual cooperation stage that the traditional roles and missions metric usually brings to the joint arena. It will even surpass the unity of command agreements that the roles and missions debate occasional creates. It will usher in an era of unity of effort within the joint realm. This unity of effort will result in significant enhancement of the effectiveness of joint warfighting through a "seamless integration of Service capabilities".²⁸

The Revolution in Military Affairs is providing, and will continue to provide, the technological advancements in information, sensors and precision guided munitions. These advancements facilitate interservice cooperation in matching mission and jurisdictional control at the tactical level of joint warfighting. Coupling this with improved situational awareness will allow interservice cooperative engagements at the tactical level of war. Service autonomy, that ubiquitous and perennial

²⁸ U. S. Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, (Washington. 1996) 5.

organizational requirement, can be maintained using the traditional metric of roles and missions.

The end result is a Department of Defense composed of separate and distinct services, organized around the traditional roles and missions that define them, all totally focused on the critical task of matching mission and jurisdictional control at the tactical level of war. This unity of effort will culminate in enhanced joint warfighting effectiveness.

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